RUJUKAN
PERANG MELAWAN INSURGENSI
MEOR ROSLAN
AHMAD TAMIM DARI
ARTIKEL DARI >>>>GWMao Tse-tung
On Guerrilla Warfare
6.
The Political Problems Of Guerrilla Warfare
In Chapter 1, I mentioned the fact
that guerrilla troops should have a precise conception of the political goal of
the struggle and the political organization to be used in attaining that goal.
This means that both organization and discipline of guerrilla troops must be at
a high level so that they can carry out the political activities that are the
life of both the guerilla armies and of revolutionary warfare.
First of all, political activities
depend upon the indoctrination of both military and political leaders with the
idea of anti-Japanism. Through them, the idea is transmitted to the troops. One
must not feel that he is anti-Japanese merely because he is a member of a
guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and
if it is forgotten, we may succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be
overcome with discouragement. In a war of long duration, those whose conviction
that the people must be emancipated is not deep rooted are likely to become
shaken in their faith or actually revolt. Without the general education that
enables everyone to understand our goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and
establishing a free and happy China, the soldiers fight without conviction and
lose their determination.
The political goal must be clearly
and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national
consciousness awakened. Hence, a concrete explanation of the political systems
used is important not only to guerrilla troops but to all those who are
concerned with the realization of our political goal. The Kuomintang has issued
a pamphlet entitled System of National Organization for War,
which should be widely distributed throughout guerrilla zones. If we lack
national organization, we will lack the essential unity that should exist
between the soldiers and the people.
A study and comprehension of the
political objectives of this war and of the anti-Japanese front is particularly
important for officers of guerrilla troops. There are some militarists who say:
'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is
vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship
that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method
used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs
are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.
It is to be hoped that the world is
in the last era of strife. The vast majority of human beings have already
prepared or are preparing to fight a war that will bring justice to the
oppressed peopled of the world. No matter how long this war may last, there is
no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented epoch of peace The war
that we are fighting today for the freedom of all human beings, and the
independent, happy, and liberal China that we are fighting to establish will be
a part of that new world order. A conception like this is difficult for the
simple-minded militarist to grasp and it must therefore be carefully explained
to him.
There are three additional matters
that must be considered under the broad question of political activities. These
are political activities, first, as applied to the troops; second, as applied
to the people; and, third, as applied to the enemy. The fundamental problems
are: first, spiritual unification of officers and men within the army; second
spiritual unification of the army and the people; of the army and the people;
and, last, destruction of the unity of the enemy. The concrete methods for
achieving these unities are discussed in detail in pamphlet Number 4 of this
series, entitled Political Activities in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare.
A revolutionary army must have
discipline that is established on a limited democratic basis. In all armies,
obedience the subordinates to their superiors must be exacted. This is true in
the case of guerrilla discipline, but the basis for guerrilla discipline must
be the individual conscience. With guerrillas, a discipline of compulsion is
ineffective. In any revolutionary army, there is unity of purpose as far as
both officers and men are concerned, and, therefore, within such an army,
discipline is self-imposed. Although discipline in guerrilla ranks is not as
severe as in the ranks of orthodox forces, the necessity for discipline exists.
This must be self-imposed, because only when it is, is the soldier able to
understand completely, why he fights and why he must obey. This type of
discipline becomes a tower of strength within the army, and it is the only type
that can truly harmonize the relationship that exists between officers and
soldiers.
In any system where discipline is
externally imposed, the relationship that exists between officer and man is
characterized by indifference of the one to the other. The idea that officers
can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal one and is
not in accord with the conception of self-imposed discipline. Discipline of the
feudal type will destroy internal unity and fighting strength. A discipline
self-imposed is the primary characteristic of a democratic system in the army .
A secondary characteristic is found
in the degree of liberties accorded officers and soldiers. In a revolutionary
army, all individuals enjoy political liberty and the question, for example, of
the emancipation of the people must not only be tolerated but discussed, and
propaganda must encouraged. Further, in such an army, the mode of living of the
officers and the soldiers must not differ too much, and this is particularly
true in the case of guerilla troops. Officers should live under the same
conditions as their men, for that is the only way in which they can gain from
their men the admiration and confidence so vital in war. It is incorrect to
hold to a theory of equality in all things. But there must be equality of
existence in accepting the hardships and dangers of war, thus we may attain to
the unification of the officer and soldier groups a unity both horizontal
within the group itself, and vertical, that is, from lower to higher echelons.
It is only when such unity is present that units can be said to be powerful
combat factors.
There is also a unity of spirit that
should exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eighth Route Army put
into practice a code known as 'Three Rules and the Eight Remarks', which we
list here:
THREE Rules:
- All actions are subject to command.
- Do not steal from the people.
- Be neither selfish nor unjust.
EIGHT Remarks:
- Replace the door when you leave the house.
- Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
- Be courteous.
- Be honest in your transactions.
- Return what you borrow.
- Replace what you break.
- Do not bathe in the presence of women.
- Do not without authority search those you arrest
The Red Army adhered to this code
for ten years and the Eighth Route Army and other units have since adopted it.
Many people think it impossible for
guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of
comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the
troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit
it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only
undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish
out of its native element cannot live.
We further our mission of destroying
the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with
consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands.
If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.
